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Chapter One: Introduction 
If you do not recognize the name Alan Kurdi, you will surely recognize his picture. Alan 
Kurdi became the face of the global refugee crisis when an image of the Syrian three-year-old’s 
lifeless body floating onto the beaches of Greece went viral worldwide. TIME named the famous 
photo of Alan to their book of the 100 Most Influential Images of All Time for its international 
significance (Walsh 2015). The picture of Alan Kurdi gave a big jolt to the public of the gravity 
of the refugee crisis, and overnight the picture converted into the literal illustration of asylum-
seekers landing on the doorsteps of Europe. The image of Alan Kurdi face-down in the sand 
demanded a humanitarian and emotional reaction, but other voices in Europe have been growing 
in force that would not agree to such a benevolent response. There are differences of opinion on 
accepting refugees on both sides of the entire political spectrum, but very few voices from 
Europe’s far right are in favor of accepting refugees.  
This thesis attempts to find the effects of the far fight on this refugee issue, but prior to 
analyzing any relationship, I want to establish the significance of the far-right party family. The 
following chapter gives a more detailed description, but briefly, the far-right family defines a 
wide spectrum of political parties unified by their strong nationalistic values, generally populist 
rhetoric, and fiercely anti-immigrant stance. These far-right parties find the most common 
ground in their common enemies—the foreigner, the European Union, or simply globalization—
as causing losses of national identity. The latest wave of the far right started gradually in the 
1980s, and since has become the fastest growing party family in Europe (Golder 2016, 478). The 
electoral success of the far right is both dramatic and unprecedented, and has presented 
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significant challenges to mainstream politics. These political parties are not simply in a handful 
of countries, but are making electoral gains throughout much of the European region and in key 
leading countries. In Austria, Norbert Hofer of the Freedom Party campaigned for a zero-refugee 
policy and lost in the presidential election by a less than a percentage point in May 2016 
(“Austrian”; Kimball). In Germany, the newly formed Alternative for Germany calls for a ban on 
mosques and in 2013 received the best electoral result for any party competing for the first time 
since 1953 (Arzheimer 536). In France, the National Front softened some of their harsher racist 
rhetoric and won 27% of the national vote in December 2015, and continues to garner support 
for the upcoming presidential election (“Europe’s” 2016).  
Beyond their notable electoral gains, far-right parties prove interesting for mainstreaming 
anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments, which I argue influence collective responses to 
refugees. Their distinct inclination to blame foreigners and immigrants for the problems each 
country is facing is one of the binding characteristics of the far right. This inclination of 
‘othering’ in political language can have immense consequences, not only on national policy but 
also on individual attitudes and experiences. While Europe faces the largest refugee crisis to hit 
the continent since World War II, the far-right movement could have an impact on the likelihood 
of refugees achieving asylum (UNHCR 2016). Historically, European countries have been 
instrumental in establishing the refugee system in place today through the United Nations, but 
currently, Europe may embody a different voice, being steered by the far right. The far-right 
parties provide an important critique to the forces of globalization that are changing the face of 
Europe. With this salient issue, I am especially interested in studying the impact that these 
parties have on one of their chief targets – the asylum-seeker.  
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Refugees and the asylum process are another interesting and multifaceted topic, but the 
far right produces a clear conflict to their acceptance. International refugee law became a global 
norm after the unparalleled numbers of refugees from World War II forever shaped the European 
continent. Since then, responses to refugees has been far from firmly established, especially with 
constant changes in migrant flows. Asylum policy is a complicated matter and can be quite 
costly – financially, politically and culturally. Although the ideology and norm behind asylum 
has been generally agreed on by the West, controversy comes in the details, especially the 
practical implementation of generosity and morality. If asylum policy is “the result of tug-of-war 
between international norms and morality loosening asylum on the one hand and national 
interests tightening it on the other,” then far-right parties may prove to be a difficult test for 
asylum (Steiner 2000, 13). The far right is especially interested in the national interests end of 
the asylum debate. It emphasizes the importance of putting native citizens and their interests 
first. This is particularly true as Europe is still recovering from the economic crisis of 2008, 
which may lend further substantial popular support to the right-wing parties. Political factors 
have always played a decisive role in immigrant and refugee matters, but Europe’s mounting far-
right party family constitutes one of the most intense sources of opposition to refugees in recent 
history. While the global refugee crisis has played a large role in the growing public awareness 
of the asylum problem, the radical hostility to refugees on the part of the far right has raised the 
debate to a critical stage.  
This study examines the relationship between the popularity of far-right parties and the 
impact on the asylum-granter on the one hand and the asylum-seeker on the other hand. Within 
this rationale, my first question asks if there exists an empirical relationship between the 
electoral support of the far right and the acceptance of asylum requests in Europe. My second 
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question then takes this another step further, by asking how asylum-seekers may choose their 
country of destination depending on the strength of far-right sentiment in the various European 
states. Both the far right and the asylum regime are complex issues hitting the heart of Europe, 
with many dynamics at work, from the ethnocentric multiculturalism dichotomy to the role of 
supranational organizations. I hope to detail the implications for refugees, when a political party 
targets keeping those very people out of the country. Starting in Chapter Two, I begin my 
analysis with a discussion of far-right parties, their distinctive political qualities, and the method 
I use to classify the far-right parties in the data. This chapter is intended to give a clear definition 
of the traits of far-right parties and a sample of the many observations made surrounding this 
party family. In Chapter Three, I give synopses of other relevant published literature on far-right 
parties, asylum recognition rates, and asylum distribution and choice. This section shows 
previous research linking political parties, often specifically the far right, to the asylum system. 
Chapter Four provides the theoretical framework for my two general hypotheses of the 
interaction between far-right parties and asylum, often citing literature as further support. 
Chapter Five explains the methodology and research design, with emphasis in the limitations of 
the variables. Chapter Six is focused on the data, both descriptive and regression statistics, with 
analysis of the empirical findings. Lastly, Chapter Seven concludes with the broader themes and 
implications from this research.  
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Chapter Two: Defining the Far Right  
Scholarly literature focused on right-wing populism in Europe is abundant and rapidly 
growing, although consensus is lacking in many areas. Defining the far-right party family 
appears to be a complicated task for scholars. Cas Mudde, a widely cited scholar of Europe’s 
radical right, analyzed 26 definitions of right-wing extremism derived from the literature and 
found that only five features are mentioned by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, 
xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state (2000: 11). In his more recent published work, 
Mudde defines the extreme right party characteristics as nativist, authoritarian and populist, 
labeling the key ideological feature as nativism—the combination of nationalism and xenophobia 
(2007: 22). According to Anton Pelinka in Ruth Wodak’s Right-Wing Populism in Europe,  
any kind of populism directed against an ethnically and/or nationally and/or religiously 
defined ‘other’ can be seen as ‘right-wing’ Left-wing populism does exist. But by 
definition it is not ethically exclusive. Political parties with an agenda aiming primarily at 
the exclusion of or discrimination against societies or different social groups follow a 
narrow ethno-nationalistic and potentially racist agenda claiming to speak on behalf of 
‘the people’ – but the people they are speaking for are defined by the exclusion of 
others(7).  
 
This nativism—the combination of nationalism and xenophobia—that Mudde discusses 
is clearly embodied in Pelinka’s explanation of right-wing populism, which excludes outsiders 
by definition. Through these definitions, the language of exclusion is a defining rhetorical 
strategy of the far-right movement, and this also explains the label of right-wing while many 
maintain centrist economic platforms.  
Another distinguishing feature of the radical right is in their fundamentally different way 
of competing for votes. Traditionally, parties moderate their position to appeal to the average 
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voter, while the radical right find their competitiveness in votes by holding their extreme 
positions. Tjitske Akkerman hypothesized that this notion will not hold once radical parties enter 
national office and be pressured to tone down their radicalness to form government coalitions. 
He found that this was not the case, as some far-right parties did indeed moderate policy 
positions while others further radicalized (1144-50). This furthers my claim that the nature of 
radical right parties has especially strong influence on national immigrant policy positions. 
Meanwhile, the driving forces of such a dramatic political surge are commonly linked to 
the recent economic difficulties in Europe. Yet Daphne Halikiopoulou found far-right support 
“was limited among the countries most severely affected by the economic crisis” which indicates 
that far more than frustrations with unemployment are involved (288). Elisabeth Ivarsflaten 
examined grievances named by the far right to find what brought electoral success for the 
populist-right in Europe. She looked at whether the success was constructed around economic 
changes, political elitism and corruption, or immigration, and found that only the appeal to the 
immigration issue united all successful populist right parties (3). Although all three appeals are 
commonly used, right-wing populist parties could still find success in elections without 
appealing to economic or political woes, while all electorally successful parties appealed to the 
immigration issue. This conclusion was also found in Geertje Lucassen’s study, namely, that 
across 11 European countries, cultural threats of other ethnicities are a much stronger predictor 
of far-right preference than economic threats of other ethnicities (570). In other words, the 
stronger link of voters to the far right is the threat posed by other cultures, not the threat of a loss 
of jobs. This link to cultural threats is especially important in regards to asylum-seekers, as many 
come from regions quite culturally different than other types of immigrants. For example, 
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temporary migrant workers, which are often from other European Union member states, are 
likely to have less cultural and ethnic differences than their asylum-seeking equivalents. 
Some aspects of right-wing populist rhetoric also can work against the party from 
receiving significant votes, as labels of xenophobia and racism commonly associated with the 
far-right party family also dissuade many voters, even if they have elements of those feelings. 
Although surveys reveal high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe, that does not 
necessarily mean that people who hold anti-immigrant views will vote for the far-right party. 
Scott Blinder demonstrates that “many majority-group individuals have internalized a motivation 
to control prejudiced thoughts and actions and that this motivation influences their political 
behavior in a predictable way [… and] strive to act in accordance with the ‘better angels of their 
natures’” (841). So, the harsher rhetoric embodied by right-wing populists may play into many 
citizens’ established fears, but also causes a response to either not vote for the far right or not 
publicly support the far right.  
Many scholars have also noted that the sway of the far right reaches beyond their 
electoral gains. Daphne Halikiopoulou argues that far-right parties have redefined the 
immigration debate by presenting the narrative that the European Union violates the values of the 
nation-state by allowing foreigners into their country (285). With hopes of gaining back voters, 
some mainstream parties have responded to the success of the far right by adopting stricter 
immigration policies (Neumayer 166). And that is why Halikiopoulou believes that “one of the 
most significant implications … is these parties’ potential indirect impact—that is, their ability to 
shift debate and change the political agenda” (288). In other words, far-right parties can still have 
significant effects on immigration policy – such as asylum – without directly possessing that 
power themselves, nor the expected increased electoral votes for the far right. This “potential 
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indirect impact” means that the percentage of far-right electoral votes does not necessarily 
correlate to increased rejection of asylum-seekers, as mainstream parties may employ such 
stricter policies on their own.  
 Using the previously established definitions of the far right as well as recognizing some 
distinctive features, this study must draw a line between which parties are far-right and which do 
not fall under this umbrella. To determine which far-right parties to include in my study, I used a 
combination of data from manifesto studies, expert surveys, and only when necessary, academic 
literature. Initially, I used the 2014 version of the European Election Studies: Manifesto Study 
Data. The European Election Studies look at manifestos for each party participating in the 2014 
European Parliament election. I chose three variables to measure “far right” all scaled from 1-10: 
left to right, multiculturalism to ethnocentrism, and fully in favor to fully opposed to 
immigration. To be included as “far right”, I decided that a party had to score 8 or above in at 
least two of the three variables. A few parties I included in my data were not in the European 
Election Studies. Since the survey occurred in 2014, some parties were no longer active that 
were in prior elections, or had joined a coalition. Also, Switzerland and Norway were not 
included in the European Election Studies since they are non-EU members. In nearly all those 
specific instances, I used the party data from Marcel Lubbers and Pippa Norris, who both use 
expert ratings, using a combination of left-right wing score and immigration restriction scores, 
on 0-10 scales. The only parties that were used without one of these ratings - EES, Lubbers, or 
Norris - are Hungary’s Jobbik and Slovakia’s People's Party Our Slovakia, but after careful 
analysis of their parties, both still fall under this definition of far-right (Pirro; Hlavac). 
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Table 2.1 List of Far-Right Parties 
Country Initials Party Name (English) 
Austria FPO Freedom Party of Austria 
Belgium VB Flemish Block/Interest** 
Bulgaria Ataka Attack 
Cyprus ELAM National Popular Front* 
Czech Republic DSSS Workers' Party of Social Justice* 
Denmark DF Danish Peoples Party 
Finland SP-P (PS) Finnish Party -- True Finns 
France FN National Front 
Germany AfD Alternative for Germany 
Germany NPD National Democratic Party 
Greece LS-CA Peoples Association -- Golden Dawn 
Greece LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally 
Greece AE Independent Greeks 
Hungary Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary** 
Hungary MIEP Hungarian Justice and Life Party* 
Italy LN North League 
Latvia NA/TB/LNNK National Alliance / For Fatherland and Freedom  
Netherlands PVV Party for Freedom 
Norway Fr Progress Party*** 
Poland Pis Law and Justice 
Romania PRM Greater Romania Party* 
Slovakia LsNS People's Party Our Slovakia* 
Slovakia SNS Slovakia National Party 
Slovenia SDS Slovenian Democratic Party 
Sweden SD Sweden Democrats 
Switzerland FPS Freedom Party of Switzerland***  
Switzerland NA|SD  Swiss Democrats*** 
Switzerland SVP Swiss People's Party*** 
United Kingdom BNP British National Party 
United Kingdom UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party 
 Notes: * party was not measured by EES, ** party measured by EES, only met 1 variable min,  
*** not measured by EES, party falls outside of EU 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 Research connecting the surge in far-right politics to refugee policy is available, but with 
mixed results. Although discourse on the connection is common, empirical studies are somewhat 
scarcer and less conclusive.  Nonetheless, significant research is available for certain key aspects 
of this study. Prior to reviewing those aspects, another relationship between far-right party 
popularity and refugee admissions could be argued as the reverse to my question. Could higher 
numbers of asylum-seekers or refugees cause increased votes for the far right? This question 
tends more to the driving forces of far-right parties, which lies outside my research intentions. 
Regardless, Pippa Norris analysis of such a theory presents that national support for a radical 
right party is unrelated to any indicators of ethnic diversity (172). He included variables such as 
the number of refugees, number of asylum-seekers, and estimates of foreign-born residents, and 
none were statistically significant in correlation to the percentage of radical right vote. The 
popularity of the far right is therefore more nuanced than the absolute number of refugees or 
foreign-born residents, but this thesis hopes to analyze the implications of the success of the far 
right rather than the causal factors. 
 
3.1 Far-Right Party and Asylum Policy  
In an analysis of immigrant and integration policy output based on the parties in 
government, Akkerman discovered that the parties in power have a significant effect on policy 
output. However, center-right parties had far more success in implementing restrictive 
immigration policies, while radical right parties had much less direct impact. Akkerman argues 
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this occurs because the ideological differences between center-right parties and radical right has 
diminished since the 1990s, as well as due to the organizational weakness of radical right parties 
in office (2012: 523). This conclusion contrasts with the link between electoral far right success 
and more restrictive asylum policy. Martin Schain counters this claim with the conclusion that 
electoral breakthroughs of the extreme right are responded to by established parties with 
supplanting some of extreme right’s agenda into their own, thereby influencing policy more 
indirectly (287). This indirect policy influence is quite difficult to measure for the purposes of 
this thesis, but remains an important factor in my argument.  
On indicators of migrant integration policy across 28 EU countries, Inken Koenemund 
found having the far-right party in parliament led to more restrictive integration policies, and was 
the only statistically significant relationship between the ideological position of a party and the 
openness of integration policy (50). Although Koenemund examines migrant integration policy 
and not asylum policy, this finding is similar to the theory behind my initial question relating to 
asylum policy. This may also prove for additional conclusions to the acceptance, integration, and 
adjustment experiences of refugees once accepted to a country, which lie outside the scope of 
this paper. 
 
3.2 Asylum Recognition Rates  
In a study of US asylum admissions, Idean Salehyan found that foreign policy goals, the 
media attention, and domestic demands influence asylum decisions -  in both positive and 
negative directions. In terms of foreign policy, the US acceptance of certain countries depended 
on the state of foreign relations with that country. The media and popular pressures presence 
sometimes emphasized the humanitarian aspect of asylum applications, while other times the 
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popular attitudes and media emphasized enforcement, and the recognition rates reflected the 
different emphasis. Furthermore, the left–right partisanship dimension of the Congress had an 
effect on recognition rates.   
Contrasting with US asylum rates, Daan Bronkhorst’s analysis of recognition rates in the 
Netherlands revealed that the admitted number of asylum seekers was very stable, despite 
drastically rising numbers of applications. He concludes that, “not determination of the asylum 
seekers’ background, but the bureaucracy of planning seems to have been the major factor in the 
granting of asylum” (155). However, it should be noted that both this study and Salehyan’s are 
based on the rates of a single country, which cannot be simply generalized as recognition rates 
patterns for all of Europe. The next three studies provide research on regional-level analysis. 
Nazli Avdan researched European asylum recognition rates in response to terrorism, 
domestically and internationally.  The data showed overwhelmingly that terrorist attacks on 
domestic soil had very negative impacts on asylum recognition rates (464). This further displays 
the role of domestic security and perceived safety as very impactful on the generosity of host 
countries, which theoretically means recognition rates are susceptible to outside forces, beyond 
the merits of individual cases.  
Citing the vast differences in recognition rates, Eric Neumayer conducted empirical 
analysis on Western European asylum recognition, even differentiating between the different 
levels of asylum status. He found no relationship from either level of asylum status (full or 
partial) and the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Dimiter Toshkov’s analysis of 
asylum applications and recognition rates follows many of the same theoretical frameworks and 
research designs as this thesis. Toshkov includes all 27 EU countries (as of 2011) plus Norway 
and Switzerland, and analyzed data annually both within country and between countries, from 
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1987 to 2010. Toshkov uses advanced statistical techniques, but found major limitations when 
using asylum recognition rates since even statistically significant effects are practically very 
small. He found no evidence that government positions on immigration influenced the 
government’s recognition rates for asylum-seekers. (210). He argues that asylum policy and 
recognition rates seem to be “much more insulated from current political and economic context 
than suggested by political rhetoric and received wisdom” (194).  
 The initial conclusions of this research reveal the complicated picture behind my theory. 
In the case of the United States, influences from media coverage, popular demand and political 
parties have statistical effects on asylum recognition, which supports my hypothesis. In the 
Netherlands, asylum recognition appears to be planned by the government, rather than based on 
individual asylum cases, providing more basis to my argument. Across European countries, 
terrorist attacks have a clear negative impact on asylum recognition, giving evidence to my 
argument that asylum recognition is greatly influence by national interests. However, far right 
party popularity did not reveal an established impact on asylum recognition in Europe by either 
Toshkov or Neumayer, which stands in contrast to my hypothesis. Nonetheless, my data expands 
upon their analysis by including the most recent surge of far-right parties and asylum requests.  
 
3.3 Perspective of Refugees 
Forced migration research approaches the factors influencing asylum-seekers with a 
mixed set of results. Researchers disagree over the amount of knowledge and power that asylum-
seekers possess in making these decision, as well as the effect of asylum policy on asylum-
seekers.   
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According to Will Jones, refugees “prioritize reaching the location where they feel they 
are most likely to be protected” (8). This claim is furthered by current examples of refugees 
fleeing crisis in Syria, Africa, and more who refuse to request asylum in less preferred countries 
of Europe (Stavropoulou 8). Christiane Berthiaum contends that in the “tight little world of 
asylum-seekers, word of mouth functions very well.” He then cites an example where in 1992-
1994, Europe faced a dramatic increase in demand for asylum requests so nearly all nations 
implemented stricter asylum policy, but the Netherlands did not implement similar policy and 
received increased requests from those being refused elsewhere, eventually enacting new asylum 
legislation in 1995.  
Meanwhile, Lucy Mayblin contends that the “pull factor thesis” – the idea that certain 
countries encourage more asylum-seekers through generous policy – is an imaginary constructed 
by the West, an overly simplified version of the forced migration regime, and lacking in 
empirical evidence (825). An extensive study on a sample of asylum-seekers in the United 
Kingdom revealed that narrative through interviews. Only a third described actively choosing the 
United Kingdom for seeking asylum, while others ended up there by chance, circumstance or the 
recommendations of other agents in the network of forced migration. The asylum policies in the 
United Kingdom had no effect on their decision, nor did any of the asylum seekers have any 
detailed understanding about the asylum system prior to arrival (Crawley 18). The study 
acknowledged that agents and smugglers may be more knowledgeable of asylum policies and act 
accordingly, and thus asylum policy could influence asylum seekers’ destinations without 
individuals being informed. 
Koenemund found that EU countries with more open migrant integration policies had 
higher numbers of asylum applications (38). This correlation represents an aspect of asylum 
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benefit that is not included directly in my data analysis, but remains an important factor to 
consider. The positive draw of open integration policy as measured by social and economic 
factors reveals another possible element of a “pull factor” but that may not be as initially obvious 
to measure as restrictiveness to granting residence to migrants, but has correlation nonetheless. 
As mentioned earlier, Koenemun also had found far-right parties were linked to less open 
integration policies. If parliaments with far-right parties are linked to less open integration 
policies, and countries with more open migrant policies had higher numbers of asylum 
applications, then logically parliaments with far-right parties should have lower number of 
asylum applications. 
One study specifically included right-wing populism on a countries’ share of asylum 
seekers. After testing a long list of possible variables on asylum destinations, Neumayer found 
that “a higher voting share for right-wing populist parties is associated with a lower share of 
asylum seekers” (174). Previously existing asylum communities showed the strongest positive 
correlation in his study, followed next by the negative correlation with right-wing populist votes. 
This conclusion falls in line with my question and hypothesis, but is limited to Western Europe 
and from the years 1982 to 1999. Regardless, this study provides a substantive argument for 
continuing the question to encompass today’s Europe. 
This thesis adds to the existing research in a few distinctive ways. First, my thesis looks 
at the period from 1999 to 2015. The scholarship I have analyzed above has not studied this 
period, nor has it looked at the interplay of the refugee crisis with the rise of far-right parties 
since 2011. Second, this thesis includes all European Union member countries as well as Norway 
and Switzerland, whereas much of the previous research has been case studies of individual 
countries, cross comparisons of two or three countries, and a few studies at regional levels, rarely 
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including anything beyond Western Europe. Hence, this data is more comprehensive of Western, 
Central and even some Eastern European dynamics in both far-right parties and asylum 
protections. 
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Chapter Four: Theory 
4.1 The far right and asylum generosity 
What are some of the possible consequences for asylum seekers of the growing influence 
of far-right parties across Europe? As previously established in Chapter Two, far-right parties in 
Europe demonstrate distinctive elements of xenophobia, ethnic nationalism, exclusive discourse, 
and often, but not always, populism. All electorally successful far-right parties are unified by 
their strong opposition to immigration (Ivarsflaten). Abundant literature on far-right parties 
reveal the powerful political impact—both directly and indirectly—of these parties.  
Directly, European far-right parties have been gaining significant electoral support in the 
most recent decades, often entering domestic and European parliaments for the first time. 
Electoral success and therefore parliamentary seats should allow them much greater access and 
ability to implement their preferred policy – stricter immigration. Although their electoral growth 
as a party family is substantial, it should be noted that their electoral success is still limited 
relative to mainstream parties and should not be overstated to the effect that they appear to reach 
majority status in most countries (Mudde 2013). Regardless, parliamentary seats allow far-right 
parties a voice in policy-making decisions, or at minimum a presence. This position would likely 
translate as stricter immigration policies, and as a crucial component of European migration, 
therefore could be measured by stricter asylum admissions.  
Although their electoral figures often do not put them in first place, electorally relevant 
far-right parties also have shown to indirectly influence their respective countries in differing 
ways than mainstream parties. As radical and extreme parties mostly distinguished by a single-
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issue (immigration), far-right parties, drawing salience to the issue of immigration, can indirectly 
require mainstream parties to respond to their public demands. Not only do far-right parties draw 
attention to the issue of immigration, but Schain argued that “in virtually every case where there 
has been an electoral breakthrough of the extreme-right, established parties have reacted by co-
opting some aspects of their program in an attempt to undermine their support” (286) Contrary to 
my argument in the previous paragraph, he continues that “the parties of the extreme-right have 
been far more successful in indirectly influencing the political agenda than in gaining direct 
participation in policy-making” (287). So perhaps a better measure of the influence of the far 
right is not in their direct policy making, but rather the influence they yield on drawing 
immigration to the forefront of the political agenda. In response to the electoral success of far-
right parties, mainstream parties on both sides of the political spectrum may react to order to 
appeal to those far-right party voters by adjusting their own political agendas, thus displaying the 
‘contagion effect’ of anti-immigrant parties (van Spanje 564). Furthermore, coalitions formed 
between far-right parties and mainstream right-wing or center-right parties allow even more 
access to policy influence than their electoral votes would normally yield. Through the 
distinctive nature of the far-right party as radical or extreme, far-right parties can influence 
immigration policy and the debate surrounding the issue at points far beyond their parliamentary 
seats. 
Even more subtle and harder to measure, far-right parties’ rhetoric about immigration 
influences media, public attitudes, and perceptions. Specifically, in regards to refugees and 
asylum-seekers, the terminology used for these people groups shapes public perceptions – both 
positively and negatively. These descriptors are intentionally and strategically utilized by not 
only the far right, but most political parties to create specific connotations. Far-right parties 
		 19	
simply provide distinct examples of the choice words used to describe refugees to emphasize 
more negative connotations. In Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, 
campaign slogans are analyzed in Sweden, Austria and Denmark as examples to show the 
emphasis on discursive language in the creation of imagined communities and the distance of the 
perceived ‘other’ by radical right-wing populist parties. Kristina Boréus specifically defined the 
negative perception of “other” by defining discursive discrimination as “unfavorable treatment 
through the use of language; it is discrimination manifested in discourse” (294). She shows that 
word choice surrounding people of foreign descent differs across and within countries, citing the 
level of ethnic nationalism in a culture as one of the driving variables. In Danish and Austrian 
radical right-wing parties, campaign slogans used harsher descriptor words of ‘immigrants’ or 
‘foreigners’ (more akin to the term ‘aliens’) than their respective mainstream parties used, or 
even the Swedish extreme right party. Additionally, attention is brought to the sorting criteria 
language used by authorities for refugees - as asylum-seeker, immigrant, and economic migrant 
– which generally produce subsequently decreasing levels of empathy. The legal rights as well as 
perceptions of refugees are significantly different than that of asylum-applicants and economic 
migrants, and thus can create consequences of discursive discrimination across political, social, 
and cultural contexts as well.  
Ruud Koopman also analyzed the role of discursive language in media to influence 
radical right violence in Germany in the 1990s. Koopman reveals that shifts across targeted 
groups of radical right were “systematically related to the differential discursive opportunities 
open to the radical right” (219). He shows clearly that radical right violence surged against 
asylum-seekers that were designated in public discourse as ethnically distinct and when asylum 
was a salient issue. Additionally, the refugees who were considered “Aussiedler” experienced 
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very little attacks from radical right violence, even though they were economically more 
competitive, because they were broadly considered to have ethnic Germany identity and 
therefore their presence was not controversial (221). From these arguments and Koopman’s 
empirical proof, it is clear that far-right parties can have real sway on public opinion by varying 
the discourse surrounding immigration, and particularly in regards to refugees, and therefore 
affect both individual’s attitudes and actions. 
In summary, electorally successful far-right parties have impacts on asylum migration 
through direct policy-making, indirect political agenda setting, and discursive elements, 
especially portrayed in the media and campaigns. But how much can those influences truly affect 
asylum-seekers? Although immigration is a highly controversial issue in every country, refugees 
and asylum-seekers are a separate and specially defined category of immigration. Refugees have 
official legal rights (ideally) recognized in every country included in this analysis and all 
countries as state members of supranational bodies (such as UN and EU) committed to 
standardizing those rights. Asylum is a well-established international norm through refugee law, 
but asylum still relies on moral authority and the principle of burden sharing, which are both 
weak and easily fluctuate. Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees 
(UNHCR) has limited ability to force states to adhere to their international legal obligations, 
lacks power to oversee state compliance, and does not have any ability to formally sanction 
states that do not adhere to international refugee law (Betts 94). The UNHCR Office discusses 
some of the significant and continuing political hurdles that go against asylum, especially the 
principles of burden sharing and moral authority. The Office continues that so long as we are “in 
an era in which states are concerned about terrorism and border security and states facing 
growing economic constraints on their willingness to provide resources and rights to non-
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citizens, asylum will remain under threat” (Betts 95). Therefore, since states can adhere to 
refugee law according to their own interests, asylum is likely highly vulnerable to other forces, 
such as the politics of states, with noticeable disparities in burden sharing as well as a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and disciplinary actions for failure to adhere to asylum norms. 
Preferably, at least for refugees, the asylum outcomes would be entirely founded on the 
humanitarian merits of individual cases, but as other scholars and clear empirical variation show, 
asylum recognition rates in Europe are highly arbitrary (Bronkhorst 151). Even when controlling 
for origin countries or the condition of the country of origin, recognition rates are still highly 
varied (Neumayer 2005). Recent events have brought the refugee crisis to the forefront of 
numerous national debates, and far-right parties have in large numbers protested the acceptance 
of refugees into their respective countries, such as Austria’s FPÖ ‘Keep them out’ demand 
(Wodak). Since asylum recognition rates are so varied, states are not held to binding obligations, 
asylum determinations come from biased actors, asylum norms are subjected to the state’s moral 
authority, I argue that asylum outcomes would be susceptible to the voice of the far-right, 
whether by direct or indirect power. To measure this cumulative effect, my theory follows the 
rationale that a growing far-right party influence would be reflected by less generous (stricter) 
asylum outcomes.  
 Hypothesis 1: As far-right party influence increases in a country, asylum generosity in 
that country decreases. 
   
4.2 The far right and asylum preference 
The previous theory poses a link between the political situation of a country and its 
consequent response in asylum admissions. However, that only tells, at most, half of the story. In 
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fact, the decision-making behavior of a migrant, or in this case, an asylum-seeker is perhaps even 
more relevant to policy and outcomes. How much does the influence of a far-right party deter an 
asylum applicant from seeking refuge in a destination country? 
Before we even begin to answer that question, though we must establish certain key 
assumptions. First, an asylum-seeker must have some degree of agency, or the ability to act 
independently and make a choice where they want to relocate. Secondly, an asylum-seeker must 
have access to information about destination countries, or at least be given indirect knowledge of 
this information (an agent). And lastly, the asylum-seeker (or agent) must value this information 
to the extent that it becomes a factor in their decision-making process. 
The amount of agency a refugee possesses in relocating is highly varied. According to 
interviews conducted with refugees living in the United Kingdom, forced migrants had “very 
limited choices about which countries they could feasibly reach and their key aim was to reach a 
place of safety” but “within the confined choices available to them there was clear evidence that 
asylum seekers made active value judgements about the different countries to which they could 
travel, in order to secure the best future open to them [including] images of the characteristics of 
those countries” (Robinson 37). Multiple refugees from one origin country cited rumors that 
another country was deporting asylum seekers, and therefore chose the United Kingdom as a 
better option. If the asylum seeker opted to use an agent (often if they had the financial means), 
then the agent provided another source of information on preferred destination countries, but 
besides the likelihood of acceptance, the policy and benefits of refugees did not seem to be 
important. Regardless, the analysis concluded that although facing limited options, many asylum 
seekers are active decision-makers in the migration process (63).  
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In the European context, the Dublin Regulation is another important factor on the country 
in where asylum-seekers lodges their application because it stipulates where asylum-seekers are 
supposed to file their application for refugee status. The Dublin Regulation was adopted across 
European Union member states in 2003 to determine which state is responsible for examining an 
asylum application: normally it is the state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU (Lyons). 
There are exceptions to the rule, such as family reunification, and most migrants try to avoid 
registration in the country they first enter, typically Italy or Greece. If an asylum-seeker moves 
on from the initial entry country without falling under an exception, officially they can be sent 
back to that first country as a Dublin transfer. In practice, per data provided by Eurostat, only at 
most a few hundred Dublin transfers have occurred in any country, except for the year 2015. 
Regardless, the Dublin Regulation does not work in practice and is already considered 
“outdated,” since the rule relies on the unreasonable expectation that first entry countries can 
solely host massive migrant flows such as the recent refugee crisis (Tassinari). The Dublin 
Regulation may play a factor in where asylum applications are lodged, especially for a few years 
included in this study, but there remains enough variation to still measure the preference of 
asylum-seekers. 
To return to the question of the agency of an asylum-seeker, specific examples in the 
recent refugee crisis reveal that individuals have noticeable preference in destination country. In 
August 2015, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the EU rules and border 
controls for Syrian refugees would be waived. The country subsequently received incredible 
inflows of migrants – later counted to 1.2 million people. By the following month, Germany had 
reinstated the previous temporary border checks (Tassinari). Although the ‘open border’ policy 
was short lived, the rapid and massive response by migrants shows that there is a clear link 
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between the reception of refugees and the preferred destination of asylum-seekers.  Yet this case 
is a clear anomaly, and the welcoming policy acted as a positive pull factor, as opposed to a 
negative factor (i.e. far-right party popularity). Regardless, as revealed in the Dublin Regulation, 
many asylum-seekers try to avoid applying for asylum in border states which shows the fact 
remains that asylum-seekers display an element of choice in determining where to apply for 
asylum. 
This raises the question of the element of a far-right party on refugee preferred 
destination preference. Since a country with stronger influence of far-right parties would likely 
have displayed more overt opposition to refugees, that country would be perceived as a less 
desirable destination for an asylum-seeker. Popular sentiments may be openly and explicitly less 
welcoming and even hostile. Asylum policy may be more restrictive and protectionist and thus 
make applicants less likely to be accepted into the country, which would be a principal deterrent. 
Refuges may receive fewer rights and benefits, more difficulty in obtaining employment, and 
more barriers to social and cultural integration.  Any of these possible effects would create a less 
desirable destination country in a rational individual. Even if a refugee is not directly aware of 
such a political situation, migrant networks, agents, and other social connections can work in 
more subtle ways to direct asylum-seekers away from the deterrent factor of a far-right party. If a 
refugee or another influence (i.e. agent) has access to this information, and values those factors, 
and has agency in the migration process, then a rational individual would not request asylum in 
that country. Holding all these true, as far-right popularity increases, then a country should be a 
less popular destination for asylum-seekers. 
Hypothesis 2:  As far-right party influence increases in a country, preference for asylum 
in that country decreases. 
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Chapter Five: Research Design and Methodology 
5.1 Research Design 
This thesis intends to demonstrate a negative correlation between far-right party influence 
and the generosity of a state’s asylum policy, as well as a negative correlation between the far-
right party influence and the preference of asylum seekers, specifically in Europe. This 
investigation limits its scope to European countries, since the recent far-right party phenomenon 
is mostly concentrated in Europe and the European region provides a unique perspective on 
asylum implications and the unique role of European Union as a supranational body. Countries 
included in my research are all 28 EU member countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and two non-EU members, Norway 
and Switzerland. My data analysis runs country year units from 1999 until 2015.  
 
5.2 Measuring the Far Right 
 Measuring the influence of the far right is not easily accomplished. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, the far-right party family has shown significant influence in different ways than 
traditional mainstream parties often behave. The influence on policy, public attitudes and 
opinion, and perceptions is very difficult to measure accurately. Due to ease of accessibility and 
comparability, I used electoral data for national parliaments to determine the percentage of vote 
for far-right parties in each country. This allowed the data to be universally measured across the 
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region. Although parliamentary electoral data does not wholly capture the influence of far-right 
parties, for the purposes of this investigation, electoral data remains the best option. I use the 
percentage of vote for far-right parties to act as the independent variable since I am examining 
for any measurable relationship to the asylum process. The percentages of the vote for each 
parliamentary party were available by Parliaments and Government (ParlGov) database for all 
European Union countries and Norway and Switzerland, allowing for consistency of data across 
countries (Döring). Elections occur in European countries mostly every four or five years, with a 
handful of variations. To calculate the data annually, I use the same percentage of far-right party 
vote each year from one election until the next election.  
 
5.3 Measuring Asylum Generosity 
 Measuring asylum generosity requires another difficult to measure variable. Asylum 
generosity may be viewed as the willingness of a country to grant asylum. Calculating 
willingness becomes a difficult task since statistics give far from a comprehensive picture of 
‘generosity’. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, I use two dependent variables to 
measure asylum generosity: the acceptance rate of asylum applications and a country’s share of 
positive asylum decisions across all 30 countries in this study.  
For both asylum sections, asylum generosity and asylum preference following this one, I 
use the data source Eurostat, which is said to be “one of the best regional-level migration data 
systems in the world” (Singleton 2). It should be noted that the Eurostat database still receives 
data from individual countries, but the strength of the Eurostat asylum data lies in its regulatory 
structure and increasingly comparable data across countries. Within the European context, 
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Eurostat is considered significantly more accurate than the official data released from the 
UNHCR, although Eurostat does not release data as often or timely as the UNHCR. (Singleton) 
The acceptance rate of asylum applications is calculated by the percentage of all positive 
decisions over the total number of asylum application decisions. A positive decision is 
considered one in which the applicant receives one of the following: refugee status, subsidiary 
protection status, or humanitarian reasons status.  
(1) A decision resulting in ‘refugee status’ means a person’s status as “defined in Art.2(d) 
of Directive 2004/83/EC within the meaning of Art.1 of the Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York 
Protocol of 31 January 1967” (Eurostat). 
The exact wording of the 1951 Geneva Convention definition of refugee is as follows 
someone “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UN General Assembly, 
1951). 
(2) A decision resulting in ‘subsidiary protection status’ means “a third country national 
or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if 
returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or 
her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious 
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harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country”(Eurostat). 
(3) A decision resulting in the permission to stay for ‘humanitarian reasons’ means a 
person who is “not eligible for international protection as currently defined in the first 
stage legal instruments, but is nonetheless protected against removal under the 
obligations that are imposed on all Member States by international refugee or human 
rights instruments or on the basis of principles flowing from such instruments. 
Examples of such categories include persons who are not removable on grounds of ill 
health and unaccompanied minors” (Eurostat). 
 
 All three of these determinations allow the applicant to be granted some form of 
protection in the country. If an applicant does not receive asylum on one of these three statuses, 
then the applicant is considered rejected. The applicant is rejected from any protection or asylum 
of the country to which the person has requested.  
 The data is run on the first instance level of the asylum procedure, so decisions that are 
initially rejected, appealed and then changed to another decision in subsequent levels of the 
asylum procedure are not represented in the analysis. First-time applicants are the only ones 
included in this analysis to eliminate the risk of counting the same applicant multiple times. 
Applications that have no decisions yet are also excluded, which does leave a significant gap in 
the analysis. The data show that many countries have significant backlogs of asylum applications 
every year. Although significant backlogs of pending applications play an indirect role in the 
asylum recognition rate, it would be inaccurate to determine the pending applications as either 
accepted or rejected for my analysis. In summary, the acceptance rate is an annual percentage for 
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each country, calculated by the sum of positive decisions (refugee, subsidiary, humanitarian) 
divided by the total number of decisions of asylum applications each year. 
 
The other dependent variable calculated to represent asylum generosity is a country’s 
share of positive asylum applications across all 30 countries in this study. To calculate this 
‘positive asylum share,’ I use data annually as follows:   
a country’s sum of positive applications 
sum of all 30 countries’ positive applications 
 
In other words, the ‘positive asylum share’ is calculated into a percentage of the total positive 
asylum decision of the 30 countries. By calculating a country’s share instead of using the 
country’s total positive asylum decisions, I can compare the percentage of all positive asylum 
decisions per destination country, so annual data is more comparable across time. 
 
5.4 Measuring Asylum-Seeker Preference 
 Asylum preference is intended to measure the agency or decision-making aspect of the 
asylum-seeker through this process. Asylum preference is determined by the country which the 
asylum-seeker selects to apply for asylum. To determine this “preference,” I calculate the yearly 
application totals received for each destination country, divided by the total applications received 
for all 30 countries in this study. This is total applications, not simply positive decisions, which 
was used in measuring asylum generosity. The dependent variable is determined as a country’s 
share of applications over all the other countries in this study, so it is represented by a 
percentage. Once again, I use a percentage as opposed to totals so that drastic increases (as in a 
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surge of refugees) are normalized, relative to the total applications received in the European 
region.  
 
5.5 Control Variables 
 In addition to political factors, the economic figures for a country are also frequently 
included as factors in both asylum policy and asylum preference. This data controls for GDP per 
capita and unemployment rate to represent economic indicators of a country, and I used the 
figures provided by the World Bank. The GDP per capita is measured at the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) in current international dollars. The unemployment rate is measured as a percentage 
of total labor force. These two independent control variables give a general frame the prosperity 
of a country by the income level of citizens and the likelihood of finding employment. Of course, 
many other factors could be included into the data analysis such as colonial links and physical 
distance, but due to the limitations of this research, no other factors on destination are included. 
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Chapter Six: Data and Analysis 
6.1 Overview of Data 
 Before my discussion of linear regression, I want first to give an overview of the statistics 
across the variables chosen to give a broad picture. Starting with the primary independent 
variable analyzed, Figure 6.1 shows the average of far-right party vote across all countries 
included in the study from 1999 to 2015. In 1999, the average vote for far-right parties was 
5.53%, while in 2015, average vote had increased to 10.75%, nearly doubling in a 17-year span. 
This figure therefore gives evidence of the substantial increase of the far-right party votes across 
Europe, and the subsequent argument that their popularity and influence is swelling as well. 
 
Figure 6.1 Average Far-Right party vote across all countries studied, as a percentage of all votes 
 
  
 It should be emphasized that Figure 6.1 represents all the European countries studied as 
an average. When we look at a breakdown per country of far-right party vote averages, we see 
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much more variation, as displayed in Table 6.1. Seven countries had no far-right party achieve 
any electoral vote– Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. 
(Czech Republic can also be included). Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Bulgaria, 
and the Netherlands had limited electoral success, all under 6%, at least when averaged from 
1999 to 2015. However, all of them have much stronger showings in recent elections than those 
average figures might imply. Greece, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Belgium, Latvia, 
France and Denmark have moderate electoral success of the far right, from 6% through 13%. 
Switzerland’s Swiss People’s Party took the lead, with Slovenia, Poland, Austria, and Norway 
close behind, and all of those countries averaged a quarter to a fifth of the electoral vote for the 
far-right party. 
 
Table 6.1 Average Far-Right party vote per country, from 1999 to 2015 (as a percentage)   
Croatia 0 Czech Republic 0.20 Greece 6.18 France 10.44 
Estonia 0 Germany 1.79 Finland 7.11 Denmark 12.70 
Ireland 0 United Kingdom 3.21 Slovakia 8.47 Norway 18.72 
Lithuania 0 Sweden 3.88 Hungary 8.82 Austria 21.42 
Luxembourg 0 Italy 4.89 Romania 8.94 Poland 22.21 
Portugal 0 Bulgaria 5.08 Belgium 9.42 Slovenia 23.82 
Spain 0 Netherlands 5.58 Latvia 10.35 Switzerland 26.55 
 
 Next I will continue with statistics on the mean of my dependent variables on asylum. 
Beginning with the asylum generosity variables – acceptance rate of asylum applications and the 
positive asylum share. As discussed in the previous chapter, the acceptance rate of asylum 
applications is all positive asylum application outcomes as a percentage of all asylum 
applications that receive a decision.  
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Table 6.2 Average acceptance rate of asylum applications  
Greece 5.7% 
Czech 
Republic 20.7% 
United 
Kingdom 27.1% Netherlands 38.4% 
Ireland 11.7% Romania 21.1% Austria 28.2% Norway 40.8% 
Slovenia 12.7% Belgium 21.9% Latvia 28.3% Bulgaria 42.3% 
France 14.0% Luxembourg 22.6% Slovakia 28.6% Denmark 43.3% 
Spain 14.6% Estonia 23.7% Finland 34.0% Lithuania 44.7% 
Croatia 14.9% Germany 23.9% Portugal 35.0% Italy 44.9% 
Hungary 18.6% Poland 25.8% Sweden 36.6% Switzerland 51.9% 
 
 Table 6.2 displays that the range of asylum acceptance rate is wide, from Greece’s 5.7% 
to Switzerland’s average of slightly more than 50%. The wide range continues with the previous 
theory that variance among asylum recognition rates is not representative as a fair picture of the 
legitimacy of asylum claims, instead reflecting other elements such as the state’s interests. 
However, Switzerland exemplifies both a country with the strongest electoral far-right support 
and the highest asylum acceptance rate, in direct contrast with my hypothesis.  
 A superficial glance at the other two dependent variables suggests that a country’s 
positive asylum share and asylum application share percentages are very similar, despite 
variations in asylum acceptance rates shown in the previous table [6.2]. Figure 6.2 represents 
asylum application share, with Table 6.3 detailing countries whose percentages are at 1% or 
below, and therefore do not fit into the diagram. Figure 6.3 represents positive asylum share, 
with Table 6.4 detailing countries whose percentages are at 1% or below, and therefore do not fit 
into the diagram. 
 In both positive asylum share and asylum application share, the seven countries with the 
largest shares make up 75% or more of the total. Meanwhile, the fifteen countries with the 
smallest shares carry 1% or less of the total. The highly unequal distribution of asylum grants 
and asylum requests coincide with the prior discussion of the failure of the principle of burden 
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sharing to address refugee populations, at least as distributed by granting relocation into a safe 
third state. In other words, a handful of countries share the vast majority of the ‘burden’ of 
refugee populations, while the bulk of other EU countries hardly contribute to 1% respectively of 
the total asylum applicants – a textbook example of free-riding. Specifically, in regards to my 
two hypotheses of the role of far-right parties, all the seven countries that have the largest shares 
of asylum requests and applicants also have an established far right party, although mostly of 
limited electoral success. Of those seven, two countries in the positive asylum share have 
moderate or significant far right party voting percentages – France and Switzerland - and in the 
asylum application share, it is France and Belgium. Notably France shows the most dramatic 
decrease (-43%) from asylum application share (14%) to positive asylum share (8%). In other 
words, their rank as the 4th lowest acceptance rate (of 14%) of applications is revealed by a 
significant decrease from their share of applicants to their share of accepted applications - which 
speculatively could be related to the political weight of the National Front. Belgium, as the only 
other state with moderate or significant far right party in the top seven of applicant share, also 
decreased its share from applicants to grants from 7% to 4%, another rate of -43%. Germany is 
the only other country to decrease its share (-17%), while all the other remaining top countries 
increased their share from applicants to positive grants.  Although these two unequal 
distributions give evidence to support the theory that asylum applicants have a degree of choice 
in their destination and that granting asylum is highly subjective in nature, the mere presence of 
far-right parties in a country does not appear to contribute significantly to the country’s accepted 
asylum share nor act as a deterrent to asylum seekers in comparison to countries without far-right 
parties, but the level of electoral support in specific countries may tell a different story. Also, 
notably countries without any far-right parties were mostly ranked lowest on both the share of 
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asylum applicants and share of positive outcomes. More on this relationship will be discussed 
later in the chapter. These next three sections are dedicated to linear regression analysis of my 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 6.2 Asylum application share  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Positive asylum share 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Asylum application share,  
countries 1% or below 
Estonia	 0.01%	
Latvia	 0.02%	
Croatia	 0.05%	
Portugal	 0.06%	
Lithuania	 0.08%	
Slovenia	 0.18%	
Romania	 0.32%	
Luxembourg	 0.32%	
Bulgaria	 0.51%	
Slovakia	 0.80%	
Hungary	 0.85%	
Finland	 1.02%	
Czech	Republic	 1.03%	
Ireland	 1.31%	
Denmark	 1.59%	
Spain	 1.60%	
	
Table 6.4 Positive asylum share,  
countries 1% or below 
Estonia	 0.01%	
Latvia	 0.01%	
Croatia	 0.02%	
Slovenia	 0.04%	
Portugal	 0.08%	
Slovakia	 0.11%	
Romania	 0.24%	
Lithuania	 0.24%	
Luxembourg	 0.36%	
Greece	 0.36%	
Czech	Republic	 0.39%	
Ireland	 0.49%	
Spain	 0.68%	
Hungary	 0.69%	
Bulgaria	 0.92%	
Finland	 1.36%	
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6.2 The far right and the asylum acceptance rate: linear regression and analysis 
Dependent 
Variable: 
acceptancerate 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
t P>|t| 
(Constant) 0.198 0.066 2.24 0.006 
frpartiesvote 0.005 0.002 0.95 0.033 
gdppercapita 1.310E-06 0.000 -0.35 0.352 
unemployment -0.001 0.003 3.00 0.730 
 
Hypothesis 1a: As far-right party influence increases in a country, asylum generosity as 
measured by asylum acceptance rate in that country decreases. 
 
 In my hypothesis, I estimate that there is a negative relationship between far-right party 
vote increases and asylum acceptance rate. The linear regression analysis shows that far right 
party vote and asylum acceptance rate has a positive relationship – the opposite of my 
hypothesis, albeit at the small coefficient value of 0.005. Far right party vote is the only 
significant independent variable at p-value .033, as the controls of GDP per capita and 
unemployment are both insignificant. Based on this analysis, we can conclude that there is a 
small but statistically significant positive relationship between far-right party vote and asylum 
acceptance rate. The possible reasons for this are examined below. 
 So, the higher the vote for the far-right party, the higher the acceptance rate of asylum 
applications. Although I was not expecting to see such a result, the relationship proves 
interesting on numerous levels. On the one hand, higher asylum admissions could encourage the 
perception of a country’s voters – in this case, an accurate perception – that more refugees are 
entering one’s country. As previously discussed, far-right voters are most dominantly driven by 
sentiments that their ethnic, cultural or national identity is threatened by immigrants. Other 
voters are also driven by the economic threats of immigrants, that immigrants will take their jobs 
and receive undeserved welfare benefits. In this way, far-right voting may increase in a country 
as the asylum acceptance rate increases. Countries may also increase their “asylum generosity” 
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and this perception of too much generosity may encourage voters to switch to far-right parties to 
express their opinion on asylum policy. Or still another case may be – probably the most likely – 
that the far-right party vote and asylum acceptance rate are not all that related, and their small 
positive relationship is better seen through the lens of time. To demonstrate the plausibility of 
such an argument, I created a graph of the two variables, simply using the averages over all 
countries from the years in study (1999-2015).  
Figure 6.2 Far right vote and asylum acceptance rate, annual averages 
  
Figure 6.2 indeed displays some degree of correlation between the two variables, as both appear 
to increase over time at relatively similar rates. However, I see reasons to believe that asylum 
recognition rates would increase over that period simply due to the migratory forces at work, 
especially from 2011 onward. The Syrian conflict broke out in 2011, as well as numerous other 
refugee producing crises across the Middle East and Africa region. These crises have well 
documented and widely known elements of persecution, hostility and overall extremely 
dangerous environments, which would increase recognition rates. Additionally, increasing 
harmonization of asylum recognition has been a specific objective for the EU towards asylum, 
especially in the last decade. Also, the spike in 2008 of asylum recognition is likely explained by 
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the change in the Eurostat’s methodology of asylum statistics. Prior to 2008, Eurostat used the 
respective countries’ definition of each category of application outcome. After 2008, asylum 
statistics were provided under the provisions of the same EU regulatory framework. This means 
the process and the asylum data since 2008 should be more accurate across countries. Although 
this could be another possible factor to the increase in asylum recognition rates since 2008, I do 
not believe it has as much of an impact. Asylum recognition rates—most likely due to the 
massive influx of refugees to the EU region—have experienced a noticeable upward trend, seen 
in the graph starting in 2012. This upward trend also coincided with the increasing popular vote 
for far-right parties across Europe, which is also affected by the refugee crisis. Regardless, this 
positive correlation contrasts my hypothesis that asylum recognition rates are negatively 
subjected to the influence of the far-right party. This correlation gives possible evidence to the 
demand-side aspects of the far right, but explaining the factors driving far-right popularity lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
6.3 The far right and positive asylum share: linear regression and analysis 
Dependent 
Variable: 
posasylumshare 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
t P>|t| 
(Constant) 0.058 0.034 1.73 0.094 
frpartiesvote 0.000 0.001 0.25 0.803 
gdppercapita 0.000 0.000 0.56 0.581 
unemployment -0.004 0.002 -2.10 0.045 
 
Hypothesis 1b: As far-right party influence increases in a country, asylum generosity as 
measured by the positive asylum share in that country decreases.  
 
 In my other hypothesis of the same theory, I predict that there is a negative relationship 
between far-right party vote increases and the share of positive asylum applications. The linear 
regression analysis shows that far right party vote and positive asylum share has a statistically 
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very insignificant relationship with a p-value of .803, and the coefficient value is 0. GDP per 
capita is also statistically insignificant while my control variable of unemployment is the only 
significant variable at p-value .045, at the coefficient value of -0.004. So there exists a negative 
relationship between a country’s positive asylum share and unemployment. We can safely accept 
the null hypothesis – there does not appear to be an empirical relationship between a country’s 
far-right party vote and their positive asylum share. 
 The small negative correlation between unemployment and positive asylum share is 
logically sound for numerous reasons. Countries with high levels of unemployment would likely 
be unattractive to the refugee due to the difficulty in finding a job. Similarly, countries with high 
levels of unemployment would find it undesirable and probably highly contested to grant refugee 
benefits or allowing the applicants to take some of the employment already scarce in the country. 
Additionally, western and northern European states, with on average much lower rates of 
unemployment, have much longer and established legacies of asylum norm, as seen in Figure 
6.2, where seven countries take in over three-fourths of all asylum-seekers in Europe. The 
remaining countries, especially those in central and eastern Europe, that have comparatively very 
low shares of positive asylum applications (or even asylum requests) as well has, on average, 
higher rates of unemployment. 
 The measure of positive asylum share is calculated to examine the results of refugee 
claims, without being skewed by the recent refugee crisis. In other words, if country X 
experiences an increase of the far-right party vote, then the country would administer stricter 
asylum admissions. During a massive influx, Country X’s total value of positive asylum 
outcomes still increases from the previous year because of the sheer number admitted the influx. 
So, then the far-right party would appear to have no effect on the asylum admission rate. 
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However, if we use a value that is country X’s share of all positive asylum outcomes in the 
region for that year, then the Country X’s asylum grants are calculated relative to other states. 
Even if the inflow was ten times as many as the year before, so long as the country itself has a 
smaller share of the number of positive asylum outcomes in the region, then the stricter asylum 
policy would be statistically recognized. Yet the data does not show any empirical relationship 
between these two variables. A potential flaw in the calculation of this variable is that other 
states may employ stricter asylum policies at the same time, so the relative asylum share may not 
decrease. However, in linear regression of the total accepted applications, far-right party votes 
are still statistically insignificant, thereby ruling out that possibility. Another explanation could 
be to the effect that the asylum process is not as easily influenced by a country’s political 
situations as I assumed. Although there are large variations in asylum statistics across countries, 
variation within countries is not as dramatic. Countries may set up quota systems, which are 
susceptible to a degree to political situations, but likely not as dramatic as I theorized. 
Furthermore, the top six countries of the asylum application share are also the top six countries 
of the positive asylum share. Their rank changes between these two, but overall the asylum 
regime likely works in a way that might be normalized over time by individual countries. For 
example, Germany has been a dominant leader in refugee “generosity” for years, and as the data 
shows, the growth of a political party against this policy likely does not quickly change that fact. 
Another case might be that far-right parties specifically do not play as much of a distinct role in 
decreasing asylum admissions as governments, whether due to their relative minority status in 
parliaments or the possibility that governments with lesser or no far right party popularity may 
set stricter immigrant agendas too.  
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6.4 The far right and application share: linear regression and analysis 
Hypothesis 2: As far-right party influence increases in a country, asylum preference as measured 
by asylum application share in that country decreases. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
asylumappshare 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error 
t P>|t| 
(Constant) 0.048 0.029 1.64 0.112 
frpartiesvote 0.000 0.001 0.29 0.777 
gdppercapita 0.000 0.000 0.53 0.597 
unemployment -0.002 0.001 -1.47 0.153 
 
 In my hypothesis regarding asylum preference, I predict that there is a negative 
relationship between a country’s far-right party vote increases and their share of asylum 
applications. The linear regression analysis reveals that far-right party vote and asylum 
application share also has an insignificant relationship with a p-value of .777 as well as the 
coefficient value of 0. This means the data shows an increase of far-right party vote leads to no 
change in the share of asylum applications. The high p-value also signifies that this correlation of 
0 is insignificant, further denoting that there is no correlation between these two variables. The 
controls for GDP per capita and unemployment are also both statistically insignificant. Once 
again, we can assume the null hypothesis; there does not exist an empirical relationship between 
a country’s far-right party vote and its asylum application share. 
 This supported null hypothesis is not as surprising since the degree to which far-right 
party electoral translates into fewer requests by asylum-seekers warrants numerous dynamics to 
hold even a possibility of being significant. For this hypothesis to work as theorized, asylum-
seekers must have explicit decision-making in where they seek asylum, which has been 
recognized in studies and interviews to a degree but is not as feasible as one might assume. 
Furthermore, even less awareness of the details or specifics of a destination country (even such 
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factors as influential as asylum policy) is known by refugee actors, as seen in the literature. And 
lastly, the negative aspects of a strong far-right party in a destination country may not be of much 
importance or even considered significant to a refugee. This logic may seem especially relevant 
when one considers that refugees by simple virtue of being a refugee have proven experiences of 
persecution, torture, and/or threat of death. The harsh rhetoric and xenophobic sentiments likely 
would not seem as important as simply finding refuge in a safer place than their origin. This has 
been documented in the previously referenced interviews with refugees, that finding safety was 
the initial priority, regardless of where that safe place was or what was in that country. This 
result contrasts my theory of the impact on asylum-seeker preference, but I believe would likely 
prove more influential in the possible reception and integration of asylum-seekers in a country.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the empirical evidence of outcomes on refugees 
and asylum-seekers as caused by the growing influence of the far-right party in Europe. The 
variables examined have real-life implications for millions of people, and serve both as an 
interesting and meaningful topic. After a lengthy analysis of the literature surrounding these two 
subjects, the empirical results nonetheless provided evidence to the contrary of all my 
hypotheses. Votes for far-right parties do not correlate to lower levels of a state’s generosity for 
asylum nor do far-right party popularity discourage asylum-seekers from requesting asylum – at 
least statistically speaking. I emphasize the role of data in giving an unbiased conclusion, as I 
found substantial amounts of literature on far-right parties, of which many drew conclusions 
from qualitative analysis as opposed to quantitative analysis. I hoped to add to research by using 
figures and not simply rhetoric. Yet empirical data also presented a problem in representing my 
hypothesis fairly, especially due to the wide variation in asylum variables. Although there is 
noticeable variance in such figures as asylum preference and country’s shares of refugees, 
explaining the outcomes by measurable factors is incredibly difficult. Another possible fallacy 
could be simply in the assumption that the electoral participation of a minority of a country can 
have national-level aggregate consequences on the treatment and decision-making of refugees 
and asylum-seekers. As mentioned in the literature review, other research attempts on similar 
theories between radical right wing populist groups and asylum recognition rates also found no 
statistical relationship, and I can now add my research to the list. I do not conclude with the 
notion that these variables do not influence each other, but rather that statistical evidence is not 
found within the definition of my question.  
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 Another observation of far-right parties that is relevant to my conclusion is a 
straightforward critique of far-right scholarship itself. Cas Mudde claims in his 2012 article that 
the gross disproportionate scholarly attention overemphasizes and creates many assertions 
around the importance and power of the far-right party family. He argues for greater focus on 
empirical and systematically proven evidence, as well as acknowledging the data limitations and 
difficult natures of many aspects discussed around the far-right party family. In summarizing my 
research, I would claim very similar notions, as the copious amount of scholarship available and 
the media portrayal of these parties would lead a beginning student of this problem to believe 
these parties are taking control over Europe in every aspect of life. And although these political 
parties are interesting in their unique sway of social and national norms, the reality that they are 
dangers to democracy or destroying the progress of Europe is far from the truth. Asylum 
recognition rates are on the upward trend across the continent, despite these political parties 
growing. I also felt this growth is often overstated in media, as electoral support for these parties 
in most European countries is less than 15%. Furthermore, even highly successful electoral 
support for far-right parties often does not produce policy either at all or at the extremeness the 
more radical statements might imply. In the words of Mudde, radical right-wing populist parties 
are a lot of bark, and little bite.  
 This research topic touches on several different themes of social and political science, 
and allowed for a few simple assumptions to be given much more depth through their 
interactions, from international relation theories of burden sharing to sociology concepts of 
discursive discrimination. Although adding to the excessive amount of far-right party literature 
was never a goal for this project, the conclusion that far-right parties do not have direct empirical 
relationships with asylum practices as I assumed may help to encourage other scholars and 
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academics to research other political anomalies in Europe and globally. Regardless, the desires 
of the far-right party pose a thought-provoking juxtaposition to mainstreamed multiculturalism, 
and the contrast becomes an especially salient topic as the post-modern world must cooperate to 
address the largest refugee crisis since World War II. 
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